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CLASSICAL AND CONNECTIONIST MODELS: 
LEVELS OF DESCRIPTION 
ABSTRACT. To begin, I introduce an analysis of interlevel relations that allows us to 
offer an initial characterization of the debate about the way classical and connectionist 
models relate. Subsequently, I examine a compatibility thesis and a conditional claim on 
this issue. 
With respect to the compatibility thesis, I argue that, even if classical and connectionist 
models are not necessarily incompatible, the emergence of the latter seems to undermine 
the best arguments for the Language of Thought Hypothesis, which is essential to the 
former. 
I attack the conditional claim of connectionism to eliminativism, presented by Ramsey 
et al. ( 1990), by discrediting their discrete characterization of common-sense psychological 
explanations and pointing to the presence of a moderate holistic constraint. 
Finally, I conclude that neither of the arguments considered excludes the possibility of 
viewing connectionist models as forming a part of a representational theory of cognition 
that dispenses with the Language of Thought Hypothesis. 
In the debate about classical and connectionist models the way different 
levels of description relate constitutes a central issue. There is, however, 
considerable confusion concerning what is exactly meant by 'level of 
description' and the kinds of interlevel connections that may be relevant 
to the debate. I have, then, considered it appropriate to start off by 
characterizing in general terms the notion of 'description level' and the 
types of interlevel correlations that may be involved in the definition 
of the two models under consideration. 
Subsequently, the particular terms of the debate are put forward. 
Thus, I indicate the description levels that a realist understanding of 
folk psychology will assume, and introduce classical and connectionist 
models as two different attempts to account for the sort of cognitive 
processing that such folk psychology would postulate. 1 Of course, these 
two models differ in the nature of their account. For classical models 
define their fundamental description level as one whose states are con-
stituted by syntactic formulae and computational relations to these 
syntactic formulae, so that they are essentially committed to the Lan-
guage of Thought Hypothesis;2 connectionist models, on the other 
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hand, will characterize their basic states as connectivity patterns and 
activation patterns over very simple units. 
The question I want to address in this paper is whether connectionist 
models will be able to account for common-sense psychological states 
in spite of dispensing with the Language of Thought Hypothesis. For 
a positive answer to this question would constitute a major threat to 
classical models, at least as realist models of our cognitive capacities, 
since the fundamental argument for the Language of Thought Hypo-
thesis has the structure of an inference to the best explanation. An 
argument of this nature only holds if no alternative, better grounded 
explanation is available. But what I plan to discuss is precisely whether 
there is any principled reason to rule out the idea that connectionist 
models can provide such an alternative account. This is why I envisage 
the main question examined in this paper as crucial to the connectionist 
debate. 
More concretely, I will seck to rebut two lines of argumentation that 
can be construed as defending the indispensability of classical models 
and, therefore, rejecting the idea that connectionist models could fur-
nish such an alternative account. The first argument appears in Fodor 
and Pylyshyn (1988). Their basic claim is that connectionist models are 
not at a ·cognitive level but at an implementation level, so that they can 
only account for common-sense psychological states insofar as they 
implement classical models. Consequently, a connectionist account of 
our cognitive processes can hardly aim to dispense with the Language 
of Thought Hypothesis. 
The second argument, due to Ramsey, Stich, and Garon,3 attempts 
to ground a conditional claim that goes from connectionism to elimina-
tivism on the basis that no systematic correlation can be established 
between common-sense psychological states and connectionist states, 
given that the former are, in their own terms, propositionally modular 
and the latter are holistically individuated. An inverted reading of this 
conditional claim will certainly lead to an argument that goes from folk 
psychology to a rejection of connectionism. 
My rebuttal of Fodor and Pylyshyn's argument points to the idea 
that they misconceive the kind of task that a representational theory 
of cognition is supposed to do and the level at which it can define its 
most basic types of states. With respect to the second argument, I 
shall oppose to the idea that common-sense propositional attitudes are 
basically discrete, and vindicate an interpretation of folk psychology, 
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· which, despite granting a moderate holistic constraint, is still compatible 
with a certain degree of discreteness in the individuation of our proposi-
tional attitudes. I will also use the central elements of my former replies 
'Ito elaborate a pair of arguments against the plausibility of classical 
models as a realist approach to our cognitive capacities. 
To conclude, I should stress that, in this paper, I do not intend to 
argue that no principled reason can be supplied against the idea of 
elaborating, on the basis of connectionist models , a representational 
theory of cognition that dispenses with the Language of Thought Hypo-
thesis. I only aim to show that neither of the two lines of argumentation 
under consideration provides such a principled reason. 
1 . THE TERMS OF THE DEBATE 
Fixing the terms of the debate about connectionism requires previous 
understanding of what is meant by levels of description and the distinct 
ways one can expect them to relate. Hence, I devote Section 1.1 to 
clarifying the notion of 'description level' that I intend to employ in 
the discussion, and the kinds of interlevel correlations that, in my view, 
arc implicated in the debate. Section 1.2 will provide a particularized 
presentation of the description levels that are involved in folk psychol-
ogy, and in classical and connectionist models. 
1.1. Comparing Description Levels 
We can characterize a description level by the sort of state that it 
stipulates and assume that, in general, state types are defined by two 
components: a set of objects and a set of properties.4 Different descrip-
tion levels can surely be compared in virtue of the so ... 1 of state that 
they postulate. In my view, two basic ways of carrying out such a 
comparison will be relevant to our debate . 
(i) One way of comparing two description levels will be to examine the 
systematic correlations or mappings5 that can be established among the 
sets of properties that define their respective state types. A comparison 
of this kind is made when, for instance, we detect a systematic corre-
lation between.a macroscopic property, like 'being a liquid', and certain 
molecular properties. In general, the strength of the link between any 
two given sets of properties will certainly depend on the number and 
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character of the systematic correlatiqns that caa be established among 
their respective properties. · ·' .· • '• · \> ;':' ~'it'· r;;~J<, · ·. 
On some occasions, however, even though .. .two sets of pr()perties 
may not hold any strict systematic correlation b~caus~ they .'are•defined 
with a different degree of vagueness, we may still be.. reluctant to deny 
the existence of any sort of systematic correlation. Ii{Yfaci} we ·ffiay feel 
inclined to say in some cases that an approximate mapping can be 
established between them, where approximation is de'arly a matter of 
degree. One can expect this situation, for instance, in comparing com-
mon-sense and scientific description levels and, consequently, it will 
surely be present in any attempt to account for folk psychology by 
means of either classical or connectionist models. 
(ii) A different way of exploring the possible connections between 
description levels will be to compare the properties that we are prepared 
to ascribe to them from a mctalevel of description that takes the states 
of lower description levels as objects of their own states. 
An intentional realist like Fodor6 would contend, for instance, that, 
in folk psychology, there is a description level whose objects are propo-
sitional attitudes, individuated by their propositional content and their 
psychological mode. He would also add that propositional attitudes 
have constituent parts and are productive, systematic, and composi-
tional. On my account, . I should say, however, that these additional 
properties integrate a metalevcl of description whose state types include 
common-sense propositional attitudes as the objects to which the afore-
mentioned properties are ascribed. As we shall see, a central factor in 
the debate about classical and connectionist models consists in deter-
mining the sequence of metapropcrties that can be truly app]ied to 
common-sense propositional attitudes, and whether connectionist states 
could share these metaproperties . 
A chain or hierarchy of description levels can often be established 
on the basis of these two types of connections. The explanatory power 
of a chain will certainly be a function of the strength an<;l character of 
such connections. Moreover , I should say that two chains of description 
levels can be compared through the analysis of the correlations that 
can be established among their component description levels. The inter-
est of the comparison will be a function of the strength of the correlation 
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and the place that the description levels under consideration occupy in 
their respective chains. 
It is difficult, however, to supply general criteria for deciding what 
makes a set of description levels a chain, when two description levels 
belong to the same chain, or the number of description levels a chain 
consists of. In fact, the way in which one decides to group and differen-
tiate description levels will partly depend, in my opinion, on specific 
pragmatic interests. Thus, the characterization I will set forth in the 
next subsection will be explicitly mediated by my interest in sorting out 
some aspects of the current debate about connectionism and, conse-
quently, it will miss distinctions that might be essential to a different 
approach. 
Let us now use the distinctions introduced in this subsection to set 
the terms of the debate about classical and connectionist models. 
1.2. Description Levels in. Classical and Connectionist Models for Folk 
Psychology 
We can assume, for now, that both models coincide in seeking to show 
the scientific respectability of the basic ontological commitments and 
generalizations of folk psychology. Thus, intentional realists present 
folk psychology as a theory about the mind that is committed to the 
existence of mental states that are causally connected precisely in virtue 
of their content. The structure of such mental contents coincides with 
that of the sentences that are used to ascribe them. 
One of the structural properties of these sentences, and therefore of 
our mental contents, is that they have constituent parts,7 namely, parts 
that in construction with others supply a molecular content. Related 
properties of contentful mental states are their productivity, systematic-
ity, and compositionality. The notion of productivity is linked to what 
Chomsky calls the generative character of linguistic competence, 
namely, the possibility of generating or understanding an unbounded 
number of sentences. By systematicity, we understand the fact that the 
production or understanding of certain mental contents is intrinsically 
connected to the production or understanding of some others. Finally, 
compositionality refers to the stability of the semantic contribution of 
each constituent part across different molecular representations in 
which they occur. 
This is the characterization of folk psychology that classical models 
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propose as a starting point in their account of cdgnitive ·'capacities. If 
we apply our conceptual apparatus to this common-sense psychological 
theory, we can say that it defines a chain composed of two description 
levels.8 ·· 
Description level Folk.l : Propositional attitudes are the states of this 
description level. They are individuated by their propositional content 
and their psychological mode, which, in turn, determine their causal 
powers . For example, we could say, at this description level, that a 
subject S has the belief that aRb at time t, where (S, a, b) will be the 
objects that compose the psychological state; whereas the relational 
property 'R ', the psychological belief mode·, and certain causal powers 
will count among the properties that can be truly ascribed to these 
objects at this description level. 
Description level Folk.2: 9 Propositional attitudes appear as the objects 
of the states posited by this description level. We are, then, dealing 
with a mctalevel of description. Some of the properties that are ascribed 
to Folk.l states from this metalevel refer, as we have seen, to the fact 
that they have constituent parts and that they are productive, sys-
tematic, and compositional. 
The classical approach in cognitive psychology purports to model this 
chain of description levels by introducing a lower description level 
whose states are defined by reference to a cognitive system that stores 
and processes certain syntactic formulae and adopts computational re-
lations towards them. 
Description level Classical.O: States are constituted by syntactic formu-
lae and computational relations to these syntactic formulae. The struc-
ture of these states tends to coincide with that of Folk.l states, except 
in the fact that the objects and properties of Classical.O states are 
individuated only by their shape. 
What a classical representational model would claim is that it is 
possible to establish a mapping from each state in Folk.l onto a differ-
ent state in Classical.O by mapping the semantic properties of FoJk.l 
states onto syntactic properties. Positing description level Classical.O, 
together with the further claim about the possibility of mapping such 
j_ 
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states onto Folk.l states, amounts to assuming, in Fodor's terms, the 
Language of Thought Hypothesis. 10 That is, the idea that the content 
of our thoughts and the rules that govern their processing are explicitly 
encoded in our brain by means of syntactic formulae that mimic their 
content. 
We can also define a description level Classical.2 where Classical.O 
states will appear as objects and different sorts of properties are ascribed 
to them. 11 Classical.2 and Folk.2 are closely connected because Classi-
cal.O states surely possess constituent parts and are productive, sys-
tematic, and compositional. · 
One habitual objection to this model is that propositional attitudes 
in Folk.l are individuated by reference to elements that go beyond the 
intrinsic properties of the organism to which they are ascribed, whereas 
classical models understand states in Classical.O as autonomously or 
individualistically individuated. 
I do not want to discuss this controversial issue now and , for the 
sake of argument, I shall feel content with the retort that Folk.l can 
be revised in such a way that its states possess narrow contents, i.e., 
states whose contents can be individuated on the basis of the intrinsic 
properties of the organism. We will call this new description level 
Folk'.l. Description level Folk.2 should also be modified in the same 
direction whereby we would obtain Folk' .2. 12 
To come to the objection we are interested in, we must reca11 that, 
as Fodor himself acknowledges, the main argument for the Language 
of Thought Hypothesis, and, in the end, for a classical approach to a 
representational conception of mind, has the structure of an affirmation 
of the consequent, or, to put it another way, the structure of an infer-
ence to the best explanation. In particular, Fodor claims that Classical.O 
states are indispensable to account for the systematicity, productivity, 
and compositionality of our thoughts, and no alternative, better 
grounded story is available. 
Nevertheless, once connectionist models of our cognitive capacities 
are developed, this inference to the best explanation cannot be applied 
so easily. For some people have argued that connectionist models may 
set the bases for such an alternative story . 13 This is precisely the ques-
tion I want to address in this paper. 
Despite the variety of connectionist models, I will seek to point out 
a number of features that all of them share. 14 Thus, we can say that 
the basic elements of a connectionist system are constituted by very 
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simple clements called 'units'. These units are interconnected, setting 
up patterns of connectivity. Connections among units can have distinct 
strengths and weights, and they can be positive or negative, i. e., excit-
atory or inhibitory. Each unit that is on in the processing has an 
activation value that is a function of the global strength, either negative 
or positive, of the inputs that it receives and it's bias, which is a value 
that the system associates with each unit. The influence that a given 
unit A has upon another unit B is a function of A's activation value 
and the weight and sign of the connection. Units are organized in 
networks, which, in turn , can have different sorts of architecture. Thus, 
networks may have a mere horizontal structure, but, in some models, 
they will also have a vertical or multi-layer organization. Networks can 
also be interconnected in various ways, and the whole system can be 
described as a network of unit networks. 
A good way of illustrating how a connectionist system encodes and 
transforms representations is by viewing it as an interconnected set of 
constraint satisfaction networks. On this view, each input unit of the 
system is construed as representing a certain hypothesis about the 
presence of a given semantic, visual, acoustic, etc., feature. Input units 
will be on with a certain activation value when the feature that they 
represent is present, or off, otherwise. 
Connections among units are to be interpreted as constraints among 
hypotheses. If unit A has a strong positive connection with unit B, this 
means that for the system anything that has the feature represented by 
unit A is likely to have the feature represented by unit B , and inversely 
when the connections have a negative weight. The particular value of 
this weight determines the ~xtent to which a given hypothesis imposes 
a constraint upon a second hypothesis. 
Propositional contents - not just features - are not located in any 
particular unit , but their location is distributed across the network. 
Correspondingly, the same unit can participate in representing more 
than one propositional content and, relatedly, the same propositional 
content can be encoded in more than one network. 
Once a connectivity pattern has been activated by a set of inputs, it 
gives rise to a pattern of activation that tends to settle, i.e., to relax to 
a solution. The system does not need to satisfy all constraints in order 
to settle into a solution: it tends to relax to the solution with the highest 
·degree of constraint satisfaction, even if a certain amount of constraints 
are not fulfilled. 15 
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One of the major virtues of connectionist systems is that they can 
learn as a result of training, whereby· they do not need to be told 
directly in order to modify progressively their outputs as a result of the 
inputs that they receive. As one could expect, a connectionist system 
learns by modifying its patterns of connectivity in accordance with 
specific learning rules. 16 
To sum up, we could say that connectionist models define a new 
description level. 
D escription level Connectionist.O: States are connectivity patte rns and 
activation patterns. The objects of these states a re input units, hidden 
units, and output units; while their nonindividuating properties are 
excitatory and inhibitory connections with a specific weight, and acti-
vation values of units in each particular processing. 
As in the case of classical models, we can also introduce a metalcvel 
of description Conncctionist.2 where Connectionist.O states will appear 
as objects and different sorts of properties will be ascribed to them. 17 
The emergence of description level Connectionist.O may represent a 
threat to a classical representational theory of mind for, at least, two 
reasons. One, if a systematic correlation between Folk' .1 and Connec-
tionist. a, and Folk' .2 and Connectionist.2 states can be established, 
then description level Classical.O may become theoretically superfluous. 
For we must recall that the most powerful argument for postulating 
Classical.O states, that is for the Language of Thought Hypothesis, is 
that there was no alternative, better grounded explanation for common-
sense psychological states; but , if the aforementioned correlation can 
be fixed, then connectionist models might represent such an alternative 
' story. Two, there are reasons for doubting the possibility of establishing 
·. a systematic correlation between Connectionist.O and Classical.O states. 
If this is true, then one of these two state types will not be able 
to correlate systematically with Folk' .1 states, so that classical and 
connectionist models will appear as incompatible. Hence, the more 
plausible connectionist models appear , the less plausible classical mod-
els become. 
Let us explore these two questions by, firstly, putting forward two 
lines of argumentation in defence of classical models and, secondly, 
seeking to dismantle such arguments and assess, as a conclusion, the 
. ·threat that connectionist models pose to classical models. 
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2. TWO LINES O F DEFENC E FOR CLASSICAL .MODELS 
I intend to examine two lines of defence for classical models against 
the threat of connectionism. As we shall see, the first line claims that 
connectionist models, as opposed to classical ones, arc not at a cognitive 
]evel, but at an implementation level, so they will constitute at most 
one of the possible implementations that classical models may receive. 
On this view, classical and connectionist models will not be incompat-
ible but complementary. 
The second line of defence questions one basic assumption of connec-
tionist models, namely, the possibility of establishing a systematic corre-
h1d6n between Connectionist.O and Folk' .1 states. If this correlation 
\v~re not possible, then connectionist models could hardly be viewed 
as a cha11enge to classical models insofar as we maintain our com-
' · nritment to the scientific respectability of folk psychology. 18 
i.t. Fodor and Pylyshyn: The Compatibility Thesis 
We find the first line of argumentation in Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988). 
To begin, we ought to see the notion of cognitive level that they have 
in mind: 
Since Classicists and Connectionists are both Representationalists, for them any level at 
which states arc taken to encode properties of the world counts as a cognitive level; and 
no other levels do 0 0 0 • 
It follows that if you want to make good the Connectionist theory as a theory of 
cognitive architecture you have to show that the processes which operate on the represen-
tational states are those which are specified by a Connectionist architecture . . .. It is, in 
particular, perfectly possible that nonrepresentational neurological states are intercon-
nected in the ways described by Connectionist models but that the representational states 
themselves. are not . (Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988, pp. 9- 10) 
Accordingly, a model is at a cognitive level only if the states that it 
posits encode contents and the ways they are processed are the same 
j_ 
as those of representational states. Fodor and Pylyshyn think that pro-
ductivity, systematicity, and com.positionality are the most basic fea- :/. 
tures of the ways representational states are processed, and this can be )~ 
explained in virtue of the fact that representational states have constitu-
ent parts. 
To put it another way, we could say that a description level A is at 
a cognitive level only if (a) its states can be systematically mapped onto 
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Folk' .1 states and (b) its states have. the same structural properties as 
Folk' .1 states, i.e., a description level can be defined that postulates a 
type of state where A states appear as objects and some of their 
properties coincide with those properties that folk psychology attributes 
to Folk' .1 states. Fodor and Py1yshyn focus on this latter respect, and 
their basic argument is: 
(1) Folk' .1 states are productive, systematic, and compositional. 
(From Folk' .2) 
(2) Connectionist.O states have parts but not constituent parts. 
(3) States are productive, systematic, and compositional only if 
they have constituent parts. 
( 4) Connectionist.O states are neither productive, systematic, 
nor compositional. (From (2) and (3)) 
(5) It is not possible to define a description level Connectionist.2 
that postulates a type of state where Connectionist.O states 
appear as objects and some of their properties coincide with 
the properties that folk psychology attributes to Folk' .1 
states. (From (4)) 
(6) Connectionist.O states are not at a cognitive level. (From (5) 
and the definition of cognitive level) 
Most of Fodor and Pylyshyn's principal argument rests on the notion 
of constituent part that appears in premise (2). They borrow this idea 
from certain analyses of the structure of language and apply it to the 
way thoughts are connected. This strategy is not at all surprising because 
classical theories take, by and large, linguistic structures as the model 
for thought structures. 
In particular, Fodor and Pylyshyn presuppose a combinatorial syntax 
and semantics based on the distinction between atomic and· molecular 
components, so that molecular representations have other representa-
tions as their components that , in turn , can be molecular or atomic. 
The analysis stops as we come to the atomic level. The content of 
molecular representations is a function of the content and syntactic 
articulation of its atomic parts. 
On this view we can introduce the idea of a 'constituent part' of a 
molecular representation as a part that has a content and that , in 
construction with other contentful parts, supplies the content of the 
representation. On this account, it is easy to see that Classicai.O states 
·: 
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do have constituent parts; what Fodor and Pylyshyn urge is that connec-
tionist states do not. 
One could be misled by the fact that connectionist models put labels 
on units and on connectivity patterns, and argue that labels on units 
correspond to the atomic parts of a molecular representation, whereas 
labels on connectivity patterns correspond to molecular representations. 
Correspondingly, we might feel tempted to say that labels on units are 
the constituent parts of molecular representations, whereas the way in 
which units are interconnected stands for the ir syntactic construction. 
This is the illusion that Fodor and Pylyshyn want to dispel. 
What they contend is that, although units and connectivity patterns 
may be labelled , these labels do not play any role in the processing. 
For units are causally connected, but not semantically or syntactically 
linked. In other words, the outcoming representation owes its content 
not to the structure of the labels we choose for the distinct units, 
but to causal interconnections among the units. Accordingly, units in 
connectionist models cannot be construed as constituent parts of com-
plex representations, since the content of the latter is not a function of 
the label of the units plus their syntactic construction.19 
Fodor and Pylyshyn introduce some further remarks to make plau-
sible premises (1) and (3) of their basic argument, although no real 
argument is supplied to ground them. But if we decide to concede these 
two premises, we would have to acknowledge that connectionist models 
are not at a cognitive level and that they constitute at most one of 
the possible ways in which a classical model can be implemented. 
Consequently, classical and connectionist models will not be incompat-
ible, but complementary. 
2.2. Ramsey, Stich, and Garon: A Conditional Claim 
Ramsey, Stich, and Garon20 provide an argument against the possibility 
of establishing a mapping from connectionist states onto mental con-
tents, or, in other words, against the possibility of defming a systematic 
correlation between Connectionist.O and Folk' .1 states. This argument 
may be read in two ways, either as a conditional claim from connec-
tionism to climinativism or as a conditional claim from folk psychology 
against connectionism. 21 If we choose to read this argument in the latter 
direction, it would constitute indirect support for classical models, for 
these models certainly are compatible with folk psychology. 
j _ 
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What Ramsey and his colleagues defend may be summarized in the 
following quotation: 
The thesis we have been defending in this paper is that connectionist models of a certain 
sort are incompatible with the propositional modularity embedded in commonsense 
psychology. The connectionist models in question are those which are offe red as models 
at the cognitive level, and in which the encoding of information is widely distributed 
and subsymbolic. In such models, we have argued , there arc no discrete, semantically 
interpretable states that play a causal role in some cognitive episodes but not in others. 
Thus there is, in these models, nothing with which the propositional attitudes of common-
sense psychology can plausibly be identified. If these models turn out to offer the best 
accounts of human belief and memory, we will be confronting an onto fogically radical 
theory change - the sort of theory change that will sustain the conclusion that proposi-
tional attitudes, like caloric and phlogiston, do not exist. (Ramsey ct al. 1990, p. 520) 
The paper begins by distinguishing between ontologically conserv-
ative and ontologically radical theory change. In the first class of 
change, the new theory assumes fundamentally the same ontological 
commitments as the old one. An ontologically radical theory change, 
on ~he other hand, refers to a case where the new theory is so deeply 
and fundamentally different from the old one that it involves a revision 
of its basic ontological commitments. This is what happened when 
entities like phlogiston and caloric were abandoned. Similarly, R amsey 
and his colleagues claim that, if connectionism proved to be our best 
cognitive theory, then it would involve an ontologically radical change. 
For the ontological commitments of folk psychology and connectionist 
models are so disparate that it is not possible to establish a systematic 
correlation between folk psychology and connectionist states. 
On their view, common-sense psychology is fund amentally com-
mitted to the existence of propositional attitudes as states that: (1) are 
discrete, (2) are semantically interpretable, and (3) play a causal role 
in the production of other propositional attitudes and, in the end, in 
the production of behaviour. They ascribe the label of 'propositional 
modularity ' to this set of ontological commitments and suggest that 
connectionist states cannot meet these requirements. 
Propositional modularity is in some ways a shorthand for the proper-
ties that folk psychology ascribes to Folk' .1 states. Thus, the fact that 
propositional attitudes have semantic content and causal powers forms 
a part of how Folk' .1 states are defined, and the suggestion that proposi-
tional attitudes arc discre te is closely linked to the idea that Folk' .1 
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states are productive, systematic, compositional, and, therefore, have 
constituent parts. 
The key idea in the argument is that propositional attitudes are 
functionally discrete states, namely, that the causal role played by each 
propositional attitude can be isolated from the causal role played by 
any other propositional attitude. This idea is illustrated by introducing 
a semantic model for memory, where it seems clear that: (a) a proposi-
tional attitude can be added to (or subtracted from) the memory net-
work without altering any of the remainder; (b) propositional attitudes 
are projectible predicates, namely, predicates that can be used in nomo-
logical generalizations;22 and (c) one can distinguish between those 
propositional attitudes that are activated and those that are not. 
The connectionist model for memory that Ramsey and his colleagues 
propose, which is meant to represent the basic features of most connec-
tionist models, does not seem to meet any of these conditions. The 
model shows how sixteen propositions and their respective truth values 
could be encoded in a connectivity network A with sixteen input units, 
four hidden units, and one output unit. About this system we can truly 
say that it stores information about the truth value of these sixteen 
propositions, but we cannot specify which part of the network encodes 
each particular proposition. Thus, (a) if we wish to add a seventeenth 
proposition to our original network, we would need to rearrange the 
whole network. And (b), as there are so many possible connectionist 
networks that can store information about a proposition (think that the 
way in which it is stored depends, for e('ample, on how other previous 
propositions have already been encoded), there is no projectible feature 
that could be isolated at a connectionist level. 
One could reply that, even if we grant (a) and (b), this will not 
necessarily prove that we could not specify how the network encodes 
each particular proposition. But this encoding has important limitations, 
since it is relative to each particular network and, therefore, excludes 
any projectibility. Moreover, we cannot say that this specification will 
help us to single out a discrete functional role with respect to other 
propositional attitudes at any particular moment. In other words, the .. 
most we could establish is a token-token correlation between the func-
tional role of a propositional attitude and a connectionist state. But 
this falls short of what was required, i.e., a systematic mapping from 
propositional attitudes onto connectionist states. 
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3. CONNECTIONIST THEORIES OF COGNITION 
I do not find the two arguments set out in the previous section very 
convincing. In fact, I intend to argue that Fodor and Pylyshyn's argu-
ment may be sound but proves too little, whereas the conditional claim 
rests upon assumptions that I would like to challenge. As a result, I 
will conclude that neither of the two arguments considered excludes 
the possibility of viewing connectionist models as forming a part of a 
representational theory of cognition that dispenses with the Language 
of Thought Hypothesis. Fina11y, I will run a pair of arguments against 
a realist interpretation of classical models on the basis of the strategies 
employed to dismantle the compatibility thesis and the conditional 
claim. 
3.1. Multi-level Cognition Theories 
Fodor and Pylyshyn claim that connectionist models are not at a cogni-
tive level because their states do not have constituent parts. I would 
agree to this, but there are a couple of questions that I would like to 
ask: (a) Why should a cognitive theory define its basic description level 
at a cognitive level?; and (b) Do lower description levels not impose 
constraints upon higher description levels? 
Question (a) points to the idea that cognitive theories must be con-
cerned not only with the properties of the states at a cognitive level, 
but also with those of states at lower levels of description. In general, 
I would say that , within a representationalist approach to our cognitive 
capacities/3 a lower level of description can integrate into a cognition 
theory only if mental contents and their structural properties can be 
viewed as emerging from the lower-level state types and their structural 
properties. In other words, a lower level of description forms a part of 
a representational theory of cognition only if a systematic relation 
can be established between mental content types and their structural 
properties, on the one hand, and those lower-level state types and their 
structural properties, on the other . 
I cannot see anything in Fodor and Pylyshyn's argument to prevent 
us from viewing connectionist states as the fundamental lower-level 
states of a representational theory of cognition, since nothing in their 
argument excludes the possibility of establishing the type-type relations 
~ .. j" 
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that our notion of cognition theory requires. The only thing that their 
argument rules out is that connectionist states have constituent parts, 
but it does not supply any reason to reject the possibility of regarding 
the productivity, systematicity, and compositionality of mental contents 
as emerging from states that do not have constituent parts. 
In fact , they seem to assume that such an emergence is possible. For 
they consider that connectionist models can implement classical models, 
and therefore they seem to grant that a systematic relation can be 
established from connectionist state types and their structural properties 
to mental contents and their structural properties . 
We must, then, conclude that no principled reason has been supplied , 
j_ 
for now, against the idea that connectionist models can be incorporated ;:·1 
into a representational theory of cognition that involves description 
levels Connectionist. a, Folk' .1, Folk' .2, and Connectionist.2, as op- '~ 
posed to a representational theory of cognition developed fr<:>m a classi-
cal point of view, which includes description levels Classical.O, Folk'.l , >:i'f 
Folk ' .2, and Classical.2. T he reference to a neurological description 
level will be required in both cases if we want to account specifical1y 
for animal and human cognitive capacities. Let us call this new descrip-
tion level 'Neurological. -1' . 
Let us now consider a further consequence of this conclusion. Resum-
ing question (2), we can show how what is true at lower levels of 
description imposes constraints ·on what can be defended at higher 
levels of description. 
Thus, it is important to remember that the fundamental arguments 
. ~ 
for the Language of Thought Hypothesis have the structure of an ;? 
inference to the best explanation . Then, if we show that a representa-
tional theory of cognition can dispense with Classical.O states because 
mental contents and their structural properties can be viewed as emerg-
ing from com1ectionist states, then we will have either to supply further · 
evidence for the Language of Thought H ypothesis24 or to accept its 
superfluousness. 
In fact, it can be argued that a connectionist theory of cognition can 
dispense with the Language of Thought Hypothesis on the basis of what 
Fodor and Pylyshyn have already granted. Thus, if we accept that 
classical states can be realized in a connectionist system, then we will 
have to accept that states with constituent parts can be instantiated in · 
states without constituent parts. But, this being so, why couldn't mental 
contents be realized in a connectionist system without positing classical 
_L 
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states?; in other words, why couldn.'t the constituent parts of mental . 
contents and the systematicity, productivity, and compositionality that ·· 
they generate be directly instantiated in the states of a connectionist 
system? I see no reason, in Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988), against an 
affirmative answer to this question. 
To sum up, we can say that Fodor and Pylyshyn do not appear to 
have provided any reason to ground the need for the Language of 
Thought Hypothesis if we accept: (i) that connectionist systems can 
implement classical models and, therefore, mental contents; and (ii) 
that my notion of a representational theory of cognition constitutes an 
adequate characterization of the task that representational cognition 
theories are supposed to carry out. Accordingly, we can conclude that, 
even if classical and connectionist models are not necessarily incompat-
ible, the emergence of the latter seems to undermine the best arguments 
for the Language of Thought Hypothesis, i.e., for the positing of Classi-
cal.O states. 
3.2. A Holistic Constraint 
The conditional claim defended by Ramsey and his colleagues seems 
to affect the relation between connectionist models and folk psychology 
in a deeper way, since it implies that a systematic transition from 
Connectionist.O to Folk' .1 is not possible, in opposition to what a 
representationalist and connectionist theory of cognition would con-
tend. Notice, however, that the conditional claim only backs an incom-
patibility thesis between connectionist theories and the classical picture 
of folk psychology; however, I am not convinced of the accuracy of 
this picture. In fact, it seems to have been shaped in accordance with 
the needs of classical models and not inversely. 
There are some important elements of folk psychology that the classi-
cal picture seems to miss. For example, the strict causal discreteness of 
propositional attitudes is threatened by the presence of a holistic con-
straint in the explanations and predictions of actions that folk psychol-
ogy supplies. 
Suppose a subject S performs an action A that is explained by the 
belief B.l, although belief B.2 could also have led S to perform the 
same action. It surely makes sense to say that belief B.l, and not belief 
B.2, has played a causal role in the performance of A by S. The fact 
that we can distinguish those beliefs that have actually played a causal 
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role from those that have not appears to support the classical picture. 
On the other hand , it would be intuitively odd to think that B.l can 
explain A if it is not against an extensive background of skills, beliefs, 
and desires that S possesses. Moreover, we can say that the proposi-
tional attitudes that we can ascribe to S coincide with the propositional 
attitudes that enable us to explain and predict his actions.Z5 But if this 
is so, then it seems that each of S's beliefs cannot be fu11y individuated 
independently of the subject's cognitive background and, therefore, 
that their causal role is not entirely discrete. For if this background 
were significantly altered, the content of each b.elief truly ascribed to 
Sand its corresponding causal role would vary, too. A parallel argument 
could be run for the predictions of actions. 
Thus, we will obtain a different picture of the properties that from 
description level Folk'.2 we can truly ascribe to Folk' .1 states. We 
wi11 still have propositional attitudes with a certain degree of causal 
discreteness but only against a background of skills and propositional 
attitudes. There is no need, however, to think of this background as 
entirely unstable and notably affected by every new input. So , we need 
not suppose that common-sense explanations and predictions of actions 
are strictly holistic, but neither can we assume that they arc strictly 
discrete or modular. 
It seems that connectionist systems conform to this restricted version 
of the holistic constraint, since the holistic character of Connectionist.O 
states is not incompatible with a certain degree of discreteness as long 
as they can be organized in distinct modules or networks with some 
excitatory and inhibitory connections between each other. This discrete-
ness may have a horizontal structure, but it may also give rise to a 
multi-layer system. If we add to this moderate notion of modularity the 
fact that most new inputs can be stored with a smallish modification of 
our previous connectivity patterns, then it becomes possible to individu-
ate Connectionist.O states across differences in background, as in the 
case of ordinary propositional attitudes. 
Connectionist systems can also mimic the common-sense distinction 
between those representations that are operating at a given moment 
and those that are not , once we have individuated the specifications in 
connectivity patterns that encode each representation. Thus, we can 
say that a certain representation is operative in a computational process-
ing when the specifications in connectivity patterns that encode it are 
j _ 
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activated across a given network of the system, otherwise we will say 
that this representation is just passively present in the system. The 
extent to which this distinction between operative and passive represen-
tations can be viewed as a clear-cut dichotomy will depend on the 
degree of discreteness a11owed by each connectionist system. Thus , very 
often it would be more appropriate to speak of different degrees of 
operativity or passiveness. In any event, we could say, in our previous 
example, that belief B.l caused S's action, and not belief B.2, inasmuch 
as the former was operative in the processing while the latter was not. 
One could argue that what the argument of R amsey and his col-
leagues excludes is precisely the possibility of individuating the acti-
vation pattern in a connectionist system that encodes a certain represen-
tation . Nevertheless, their argument is sound only if we assume that 
representational contents are strictly discrete. If, by contrast, we grant 
that the individuation of both Connectionist.O and Folk'.l states is 
subject to a version of the holistic constraint compatible with a certain 
degree of discreteness, then nothing in their argument prevents us from 
establishing this systematic correlation . 
There are, however, some further problems in our way to establish 
a systematic correlation between Folk'.l and Connectionist.O states. I 
wil1 briefly point out some of them. 
To start , one could say that the fact that Connectionist.O states can 
be individuated in a much more accurate and precise way than Folk' .l 
states challenges the possibility of a strict systematic correlation. For, 
if a mapping between states of these two types could be a t all estab-
lished , it would involve such a remarkable degree of vagueness or 
coarseness that it_s explanatory relevance will diminish significantly. 
In a slightly different direction, one could point out that , whereas it 
makes sense to produce a complete desc1iption of a system within a 
description level Connectionist.O, it is not so obvious that a complete 
description could be supplied within description level Folk'. 1. For our 
ordinary psychological explanations appear to be context-dependent, 
at least in the sense that our individuation of a subject's propositional 
attitudes is usually a function of rather specific pragmatic interests. We 
assume that these propositional attitudes are individuated against a 
background of skills and propositional attitudes that can be rendered 
partly explicit if required; but there seems to be no obvious way to 
yield a complete description of a subject 's propositional attitudes. Nev-
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ertheless, if a correlation between Connectionist.O and Folk'.l states is 
going to be possible, then such a complete description of Folk ' .l states 
would be required. 
One way of escaping these two obstacles is claiming that a connec-
tionist theory of cognition is only indirectly interested in such a mapping 
between Folk' .1 and Connectionist.O states. For what is really needed 
is a systematic correlation between Connectionist. O states and a sort of 
representational state stipulated by a new description level, Represcnta-
tional.Ol, rather distant from description level Folk' .1, but sti11 repre-
sentational and individualistic. Representational.Ol states will also dif· 
fer from Classical.O states because the former cannot be strictly syntactic 
and discrete, although they are committed to a new version of the 
Language of Thought Hypothesis, which, in opposition to the tra-
ditional one, is still in need of an initial clarification of its central 
features. 26 
In any event, it seems clear that the major current contribution of 
connectionism to the understanding of our cognitive capacities is not to 
have supplied correlations between connectionist and representational 
states, but to have shown how a physical system can naturally possess 
some of the most striking properties of our cognitive capacities. For 
example, soft-constraint satisfaction, spontaneous generalization, con-
tent-addressable memory, gradual-concept acquisition, graceful degra-
dation , etc. All these features arc in some way connected to the holistic 
constraint, but unfortunately I do not have room here to analyze how 
connectionist models could account for them. 27 I want simply to suggest 
that, on my account, they will constitute properties of both Folk' .1 and 
Connectionist.O states that are ascribed from their respective metalevcls 
of description. This fact suggests that a strong systematic correlation 
can be cstab1ished between the properties truly attributed to the objects 
that compose Folk' .2 and Connectionist.2 states. 
3.3. A gainst Classical Models 
One can use the arguments developed in the two previous subsections 
not only to defend connectionism but also to attack classical models. 
At this point, we can distinguish two claims: 
Claim (1): Classical.O states cannot be systematically correlated to 
Folk' .1 states . 
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Claim (2): Even if Classical.O states can be systematically 
correlated to Folk' .1 states, they do not meet the constraints 
imposed by Neurological. - 1 states . 
Although claim (2) is weaker than claim (1), I consider that the truth 
o f the former would be enough to undermine classical models as a 
plausible theory of how human and animal cognition actually operates. 
With respect to claim (1), we can say that the argument that Ramsey 
and his colleagues run from functional discreteness to the impossibility 
of mapping from mental representations onto connectionist states can 
now be inverted and transformed into an argument that runs from the 
holistic constraint to the impossibility of a systematic mapping between 
mental representations and formulae in the Language of Thought. 
Thus, suppose we set up a mapping from the causal roles of the 
formulae F.l, .. . , F.n in mentalese onto the causal roles of mental 
contents Mc.1, ... , Mc.n. Observe what happens if we enter a new 
formula F.n + 1 into the network- the rest of the set remains unaltered 
given that formulae in mcntalese are functionally discrete ; but if a new 
mental content appears, Mc.n + 1., many elements of the network have 
to be rearranged , so that we get a new set Me' .1 , Me' .2, ... , Mc.i, ... , 
Mc'.n, Mc.n + 1. Thus, the old mapping is no longer strictly valid and 
a new mapping is required , and this will happen each time that a 
variation in mental contents is produced. 
Of course, this is a very simplistic case because the holistic constraint 
admits of a certain degree of discreteness whereby not all mental repre-
sentations need to be affected by the introduction of new contents and, 
on the other hand, some modules may have rather stable backgrounds. 
Taking into account these two factors, one can expect that classical 
models may be good at supplying a coarse mimicking for those cognitive 
capacities that are carried out within modules with rather stable back-
grounds. But we can no longer expect a strict systematic correlation 
between Classical.O and Folk' .1 states. 
Regarding claim (2), I would like to say that, even though classical 
models could supply mechanisms to mimic strictly all our cognitive 
capacities, they cou1d hardly be construed as realistic models about the 
way our mind operates. For at a lower level, namely at a neurological 
level, our knowledge imposes some constraints upon what can be true 
at a cognitive level? 8 
To illustrate this point, let us briefly examine what is implicated in 
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our capacity to perform multi-constraint tasks like preparing breakfast 
or playing soccer, where many variable features of the environment 
need to be taken into consideration at the same time. We are generally 
good at this sort of task. Our way of performing such tasks displays a 
number of properties that have been described as graceful degradation , 
tolerance to damage and noise, etc. What aU these properties seem to 
have in common is that we are able to maintain the standard of our 
performance despite failures in the satisfaction of some constraints that 
ought to be met or, in any event, that degradation in our performance 
tends to be gradual. 
This situation has been explained by the fact that the constraints that 
arc involved in such tasks are not hard , but soft.29 I should say that a 
constraint is hard if its violation collapses the successful performance 
of the task, whereas a constraint is soft when it integrates a set of 
constraints, any one of which can be violated without collapsing the 
successful performance of the task. Of course, the increase in the 
number of soft constraints that are infringed on will reduce the accuracy 
of the performance leading to a process of graceful degradation. 
It seems clear that connectionist models will naturally simulate soft-
constraint satisfaction, since, as we pointed out in Section 1.2, connec-
tionist systems tend to settle into the solution with the highest degree 
of constraint satisfaction, even if not all constraints are satisfied. In 
fact, the softness of connectionist constraints represents one of the most 
appealing features of connectionist models. 
The question now is whether classical models can simulate soft-
constraint satisfaction within the boundaries of our neurological struc-
ture. It seems clear that classical models can only produce explicit, hard 
rules, since Classical.O states are constituted by syntactic formulae and, 
therefore, all rules need to be stated syntactically. Syntactic objects are 
composed of discrete constituent parts. The question about whether 
two syntactic objects are identical is an ali-or-nothing matter: it depends 
on whether all their constituent parts coincide. Similarly, the question 
about whether a certain rule applies to a syntactic formula will also be 
an ali-or-nothing matter: it will depend on whether the latter has exactly 
the constituent · parts specified oy the former. The point is that if one 
of the constraints indicated by the rules is not satisfied, then the rule 
will not apply. Of course, a rule can include indications about possible 
exceptions, but, in any case, each possible exception needs to be ex-
plicitly stated. In other words, we can say that any attempt to simulate 
j _ 
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soft-constraint performances by classical models will require the intro-
duction of further explicit, hard rules that specify how every exception '. 
will affect the development of the task. . .. ; 
We must remember, however, that the number of features of the .· 
environment that may be relevant to a multi-constraint task is indefi-
nitely large and, therefore, that the number of possible exceptions or 
variations in the rule will also be indefinitely large. Hence, we can 
easily see that any attempt to model soft-constraint performances by 
means of hard constraints, as classical models seek to do, would lead 
to a sort of computational explosion. For, given that we are dealing 
with sequential processing, we would need to increase dramatically the 
speed and number of units implicated in the processing, not only to be 
able to perform the task at all, but also in order to perform it in real 
time . 
All this suggests that classical models may be neurologically implaus-
ible because they structure their data in a way quite different from the 
way our brain operates. Rumclhart and McClelland (1986b) point out, 
for instance, that neurons are much more interconnected than classical 
units, and that learning in our brain seems to be associated with varia-
tions in neuronic interconnections rather than with alterations of the 
units themselves. Nevertheless, what seems to discard radically classical 
models as a realist model for our cognitive capacities is the fact that 
their modelling of our performance of multi-constraint tasks would go 
beyond the boundaries, established by Feldman and Ballard (1982), of 
the speed of neuronic processing. They argue that a plausible neurolog-
ical model ought not to take more than one-hundred serial steps per 
second, but any clas~ical algorithm designed to simulate any of the 
multi-constraint tasks we are quite good at would certainly go far 
beyond thiS upper bound?0 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, I have examined a compatibility thesis and a conditional 
claim on the way classical and connectionist models relate. With respect 
to the compatibility thesis, I have argued that, even if classical and 
connectionist models are not necessarily incompatible, the emergence 
of the latter seems to undermine the inference to the best explanation 
upon which the Language of Thought Hypothesis, and therefore the 
positing of Classical.O states, appears to rest. For an inference of this 
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nature only holds if no alternative, better grounded explanation is 
available, and I have been arguing that nothing in Fodor and Pylyshyn's 
argument conflicts with the possibility that connectionist models inte-
grate into a representational theory of cognition that, apart from being 
backed by stronger evidence , accounts for the structural properties of 
the mental representation without postulating the Language of 
Thought. 
I have attacked the conditional cJaim presented by Ramsey and his 
colleagues by pointing to the presence of a moderate holistic constraint 
in the explanations and predictions of actions that folk psychology 
supplies. Thus, I have sought to show not only that connectionist models 
are in principle compatible with this moderate holistic constraint but 
also that classical models will have trouble meeting this constraint, since 
an inverted version of the conditional claim could be addressed against 
them. 
Moreover, I have argued that classical models could hardly be con-
strued as a realist approach to the way our mind operates. For it can 
be argued, in the context of a multi-level cognition theory, that classical 
models can hardly satisfy the constraints that our knowledge at a neurol-
ogical level imposes upon what can be ttue at a cognitive level. 
Accordingly, we are in a position to conclude that neither of the two 
Jines of argumentation considered excludes the possibility of viewing 
connectionist models as contributing to a multi-level theory of cognition 
that, in spite of dispensing with the neurologically implausible postu-
lation of the Language of Thought, is able to include a notion of 
mental representation continuous with the basic features of our folk 
psychology. 31 
NOTES 
1 Of course, both classical and connectionist models have also been used to support 
eliminalivist stances with respect to folk psychology. In fact, what I seek to do, in this 
paper, is to assess whether classical and/ or connectionist models can account, at least in 
principle, for folk psychology. An affirmative response would back intentional realism 
(cf. Fodor (1987, Chapter 1 ,and Appendix) for classical models, and Smolensky (1988) 
for connectionist models), whereas a negative answer would advise an eliminativist posi-
tion (cf. Stich (1983) for classical models, and Ramsey et al. (1990) for connectionist 
models). 
2 This hypothesis was established in Fodor (1975). For a more recent vindication of this 
hypothesis, see Fodor (1987), Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988), Fodor and McLaughlin (1990). 
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3 In Ramsey et at. (1990). . . . . 
4 In this context, I unuerstand that the term 'property' concerns not only properties of 
single objects, but also relations among objects. I should also say that each description 
level will certainly supply more or less flexible crite ri a for distinguishing between the 
individuating and nonindividuating properties of objects. 
5 ln this paper I take the notion of systematic correlation as primitive, and I use 'mapping' 
as a synonym. 
~'> As Fodor puts it, an intentional realist will assume: (i) " [t)hat there are beliefs and 
desires and that there is a matter of fact about their intentionai contents"; (ii) " lilt may 
be that believing and desiring will prove to be states of the brain"; and (iii) "[t]hat beliefs 
and desires have causal roles and that overt behavior is typically the effect of complex 
interactions among these mental causes" (Fodor 1987, p. 135). 
7 At this point 1 am following Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988). 
8 Of course, it is always possible to distinguish further description levels within folk 
psychology, but 1 only mean to specify those that are directly relevant to our discussion 
about connectionism. 
9 In order to account for these properties of propositional attitudes, we ought to introduce 
an intermediate description level where propositional attitudes will no longer be under 
consideration, but will be the distinct structures of these propositional attitudes. These 
structures will be det~rmined hy the analysis of the syntactic and semantic relations 
among propositional attitudes. An easy way to produce a general characterization of these 
states is reading as variables what in Folk.l states appear as constants and eliminating the 
reference to time. 
This intermediate description level will not be relevant, however, to my analysis of the 
debate between classica l and connectionist models. 
[() cr. note 2. 
11 Of course, both classical and connectionist models will also take into consideration 
that any account of human cognitive capacities must be neurologically instantiated, 
although, as we shall see, they stress this point quite differently. 
12 For the classical case against the notion of narrow content, cf. Putnam (1975) and 
Burge (1979). For a classical defence of this notion, cf. Fodor (1975, 1980) and Field 
(1978). Interesting discussions of this topic can be found in Woodfield (1982) and Pettit 
and McDowell (1986). For more recent criticism of narrow content, see Putnam ( 1988, 
Chapters 1-3) and an interesting revision of the concept in Fodor (1987 , Chapter 2; 1991). 
13 For indicatio'ns in this direction, cf. Rumelhart and McClelland (1986b), Smolensky 
(1988), Clark (1989a), Horgan and Tienson (1989), and Hanson and Burr (1990). 
14 A more detailed characterization of the general features of connectionist models can 
be found in Rumclhart ct at. (1986), Smolensky (1988), and Hanson and Burr (1990). 
For a taxonomy of the different connectionist models, cf. Rumelhart et al. (1986, pp. 
54-72) and Hanson and Burr (1990, pp. 472- 76). 
15 As we shall see later, this sort of constraint is usually characterized as soft, in contrast 
to hard constraints, that is, those whose violation entirely collapses the processing. 
I want to stress, in any event, that our illustration of how representations arc encoded 
in a connectionist system is, of course, extremely simplistic in many respects; and yet I 
find it useful because, in my view, it captures some of the basic ideas that guide the 
elaboration of actual, more sophisticated connectionist models. 
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16 A number of different learning rules have been proposed for connectionist systems. 
One of the first, and one which underlks many others, is due to Hebb: 
When an axon of cell A is near enough to excite a ceU B and repeatedly or persistently 
takes part in firing it, some growth process or metabolic change takes place in one or 
both cells, such that A's efficiency, as one of the cells firing B, is increased. (Hebb 
1949, p. 62) 
Accordingly, we can say that when two units A and B of the same network are simulta-
neously excited, the connection strength increases. Inversely, when two units of the same 
network tend not to be simultaneously excited, then the connection is modified in an 
inhibitory direction. An interesting aspect of this learning procedure is that it is localized 
in the connections between units and it does not require overall supervision. 
17 Cf. Clark (1989a, pp. 188-96) for an interesting presentation of the different levels of 
description that may be implicated in connectionist models. 
tH This argument was originally proposed in Ramsey eta\. (1990) to support a conditional 
claim from connt!ctionism to climinativism, but it can be transformed into a conditional 
claim from representationalism to classical models and against connectionism. 
19 Thus, Fodor and Pylyshyn remark: 
Strictly speaking, labels play 110 role at all in determining the operation of a connec-
tionist machine; in particular the operation of the machine is unaffected by the syntactic 
and semantic relations that hold among the expressions that are used as labels. To put 
this another way, the node labels in a connectionist machine are not part of the causal 
structure of the machine .... Whereas, by contrast, the state transitions of classical 
machines are causally determined by the structure - including the constituent structure 
- of the symbol arrays that the macMne tramforms. (Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988, p. 17) 
2° Cf. Ramsey eta\. (1990). 
21 Tn other words, one may want to use this argumt!nt to challenge the scientific respect-
ability of common-sense psychology insofar as their states cannot find a scientific corrc~ 
late, were connectionism to settle as the most satisfactory scientific approach to cognitive 
capacities. Or one might feel inclined to argue that what the gap proves is that connec-
tionist theories cannot account for our cognitive capacities. The option between these 
two opposite readings will depend on the stance that each one wants to adopt with respect 
to the more generic issue of whether we can make sense of the idea of cognitive capacity 
without ascribing content to cognitive states. I do not intend to discuss this generic issue 
in the present text. 
I would like to point out, however, that the fact that some people could adopt an 
eliminativist stance in regard to folk psychology would not necessarily rule out the 
possibility of claborating1 as a subfield of scientific psychology, an account of why the 
folk think about mental states the way they do (cf. Goldman 1993, p. 15). 
22 We can introduce generalizations like the following: if X was told that p, X will 
normally remember that he has been told that p. These sorts of generalizations work no 
matter how different the psychological features of some given subjects might be from 
other points of view. 
23 At this point, I confine myself to a representationalist approach because Fodor and 
Pylyshyn are also committed to this kind of approach. 
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24 Of course, one expects the evidence for connectionist models to be stronger than a 
mere inference to the best explanation. 
25 Cf., for instance, Dennett (1971). 
26 Further suggestions in this direction are in Clark (1989b). 
27 One can find suggestive characterizations of how connectionist models could in prin-
ciple account for these features of our cognitive capacities in McClelland et at. (1986 , 
Clark (1989a, Chapters 5, 6), Horgan and Tienson (1989, pp . 50-54), and H anson and 
Burr (1990). 
28 Of course, this claim becomes entirely intelligible in the context of what I have 
characterized as a multi-level cognition theory . 
29 For an interesting analysis of the distinction between soft and hard constraints, cf. 
Horgan and Tienson (1986). 
3° For an analysis of this point developed as a criticism of Fodor an'd Pylyshyn (1988), 
sec Chater and Oaksford (1990). In Clark (1989a, Chapter 4), we find suggestions about 
the implausibility of classical models from the point of view of evolution . 
. 
31 This paper has benefited from comments by Kathleen Wilkes, Terem:e Horgan, 
Stephen Mills, Michael Devitt, Ana E stcla , Jerry Fodor, Joscp Luis Prades, Carlos Moya, 
Andy Clark, Marti~ Davies, Stephen Stich and Tobies Grimaltos. 1 am particularly 
grateful to Gerard O'Brien for our discussion about connectionism. Tam also obliged to 
two anonymous referees of Synthese for their helpful suggestions. Finally, I should also 
say that this paper forms part of a research project that T developed at Oxford University 
during the academic year 1988- 89, thanks to a grant awarded by the Valencian Council 
of Culture, Education and Science. 
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